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Abstract. Up to the mid-1990s almost all Norwegian local governments had 
a decentralized structure on their facility management. Over the following 
15 years a swift centralization followed, and in 2010 roughly 85% of the local 
governments used a centralized structure. Centralization is in accordance 
with the recommendation from a government commission studying the topic, 
but the arguments are not unambiguous. This paper formulates a stylized 
model for the relationship between facility management and production of 
welfare services. The model suggests that it is not obvious that a centralized 
structure is superior for all local governments, but that this may depend 
on local factors. Consistent with the predictions from the stylized model, 
the empirical findings suggest that large local governments with a weak 
political leadership centralize their facility management, while small local 
governments with a strong political leadership prefer a decentralized 
structure.
1 Introduction
During a period of 10–15 years starting in the mid 1990s a rapid change in the 
organizational structure of the facility management took place in Norwegian local 
governments. While almost all local governments had a decentralized structure on 
their facility management when entering the 1990s, a large majority had switched 
to a centralized structure by the mid 2000s (Haugen, 2003). The two structures are 
very different. In the decentralized framework, the service producing agencies are 
responsible for operating and maintaining their own facilities. In the centralized 
framework a central facility management agency holds this responsibility.
*) Comments and suggestions by Lars-Erik Borge, Fredrik Carlsen, the editor in chief, two 
anonymous referees and participants at a seminar at the Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology are much appreciated. I am thankful for funding from the Norwegian Ministry of local 
government and regional development. Some of the data is obtained from the Norwegian Social 
Science Data Service. The author bears the full responsibility for the analysis and the conclusions 
that are drawn.
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In 2003 a government commission was appointed to evaluate the facility 
management in the local public sector in particular. In its final report (NOU, 
2004) the commission concluded that a vast majority of local governments had 
insufficient levels of maintenance and that this to some extent was due to the 
organizational structure of the facility management. The commission went on 
to recommend that the local governments should adopt a centralized structure. 
A similar conclusion is found in a report commissioned by The Norwegian 
Association of Local and Regional Authorities (Econ and Multiconsult, 2002). 
The Norwegian debate is related to the international debate on contracting out 
services and strategic facility management (see e.g. Krumm et al., 1998; Clark and 
Rees, 2000; Alexander, 2003; and Atkin, 2003).
Despite the recommendations in NOU (2004), a considerable number of 
local governments have kept a decentralized structure. In this paper I investigate 
under which circumstances a decentralized structure is optimal, within the 
framework of a stylized political economy model. Using survey data, I test a few 
implications of the model empirically. This enables a discussion about whether 
local governments choosing a decentralized structure make their choice based 
on a rational consideration of local conditions, or are lagging behind in the 
development of more efficient organizational structures.
The most commonly used arguments in favor of a centralized structure 
relate to building technical competence. It is expected that a centralized facility 
management agency will have higher technical competence than an agency with 
production of welfare services as its main purpose. Furthermore, whereas a central 
facility management agency has facility management as its sole purpose, the 
service producing agencies focus mainly on production of services.
This can cause two problems for local governments with a decentralized 
structure. It may be the case that important maintenance activity is neglected. This 
can be both because the service producers may choose to cut down on maintenance 
in order to boost other expenditures or that it lacks the competence to observe the 
actual need for maintenance. Further, it can also be that the maintenance activity 
is not effective in terms of preserving technical condition. This is for example the 
case if maintenance activity is focused on fixing highly visible, but not necessarily 
fundamental, problems rather than underlying problems that are hard to observe 
for an untrained eye.
One argument in favor of decentralization, on the other hand, is the possibility 
for utilization of local knowledge.1 It may be that some parts of the maintenance 
activity have a larger impact on the service production in the facilities than others. 
If this is the case, a decentralized structure can be beneficial since it will be easier 
to relate maintenance activity to other operations when the decisions are taken at 
the local level. The local knowledge may also to some extent be tacit knowledge 
which can be unobservable for a centralized agency. Hence, the service producer 
1  Econ and Multiconsult (2002) mentions the tight connections between janitors and management 
in the service producing agency as an advantage with the decentralized model.
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may to some extent compensate for lower building technical competence with 
higher local knowledge.
The stylized theoretical model has two implications. First, the local 
governments most able to establish a highly qualified central facility management 
agency will benefit most from centralization in terms of increased technical 
competence. Second, the more difficult it is for the local governments to monitor 
the activities of their service producer(s), the more they will benefit from 
centralization of the facility management.
Data limitations force me to take a descriptive approach in the empirical 
study, looking at only a few key characteristics of the local governments. I expect 
small and rural local governments to gain less in terms of technical competence 
from centralization. The reason is that rural areas have limited access to highly 
qualified personnel. Further, monitoring the activities of service producers is 
likely more difficult in (i) large municipalities, and (ii) local governments with 
a weak political leadership. The hypothesis is thus that large local governments 
with a weak political leadership are more likely to centralize, while small local 
governments with a strong political leadership may prefer a decentralized structure.
The results provide support for this hypothesis. The findings thus indicate 
that local governments are able to consider the different structures and choose the 
one that fits them best. This is in contrast to a widespread opinion that all should 
centralize and that the ones with a decentralized structure are lagging behind in 
the development. An alternative explanation is that small local governments that 
are not able to utilize the advantages of centralization are too small and should be 
merged with neighboring local governments. Local government amalgamation is, 
however, a huge topic in itself. In this paper I take the local government size as 
given.
In a broader context, this paper is related to studies of reforms in the public 
sector. In a recent study, Bonesrønning (2012) finds that public sector employees 
are reluctant to implement accountability reforms meant to enhance public sector 
productivity. Rattsø and Sørensen (2004) present similar findings. The skepticism 
is especially related to reforms which introduce competition in the production of 
public services. The two Norwegian studies are related to studies of how different 
interest groups can influence policy outcomes. Early contributions are Dubin and 
Navarro (1988) and Coughlin et al. (1990).
It is worthwhile noting that centralization of the facility management in 
Norway rarely involves privatization and increased competition. The reason is that 
centralization in most cases involves the establishment of a municipal agency for 
facility management (see Tables 1 and 2). Hence, there is probably less ideological 
dispute concerning centralization of the facility management than what is found 
in the earlier studies of public sector reforms in Norway. In fact, I fnd no trace of 
political preferences in the choice of structure in the empirical analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a 
stylized model of facility conditions and production of welfare services, illustrating 
the decision problem for the local governments. Survey data on the organization of 
the facility management in Norwegian local governments is presented in Section 
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3 before the empirical specification is presented in Section 4. The main results 
from the empirical analysis are discussed in Section 5. Finally, some concluding 
remarks are offered in Section 6.
2 A Stylized Model of Facility Conditions and Production of Welfare 
Services
I study a simple organizational framework where a sponsor (i.e. the central organs 
of the local government) has to choose between a decentralized or centralized 
structure for its facility management. To simplify, I assume that there is only one 
public service, produced by a single service producing agency. Centralization 
involves the establishment of a centralized single-purpose facility management 
agency, while facility management lies under the service producing agency in 
the decentralized case. The sponsor has an exogenous income Y which is to be 
distributed between operational expenditures, r, and maintenance, m. The budget 
constraint is thus
 Y = r + m  (1)
The important difference between the two structures is that in the decentralized 
case the service producer receives Y and decides the allocation between r and 
m. In the centralized case, the sponsor decides the allocation and grants r to the 
service producing agency and m to a centralized facility management agency. The 
sponsor has a utility function over production of services (X), while the production 
of services depends on operational expenditures and the usability of the facilities 
(K). The sponsor’s utility function and the production function for services are 
given by (2) and (3), respectively.
 ws = u (X )  (2)
 X = x (r, K )  (3)
 
As is standard in the economics literature, I assume positive and decreasing 
marginal utility and productivity, i.e. x', u' > 0 and x", u" < 0. The usability of the 
facilities depends on the maintenance expenditures and how efficiently these are 
spent as presented in (4).
  ( ) ,  ,  i iK K m i D Cα β= + + =  (4)
The constant K  indicates that the facilities may still be used even in the absence 
of maintenance.2 Usability is broadly defined as how well the facilities serve 
the purpose of producing services. Usability thus includes, but is not restricted 
to, technical condition. αi is the building technical competence, while βi gives 
how well the maintenance is related to the actual production of services (local 
2 This is a one-period model and does not take into account the obvious fact that too low 
maintenance over time will lead to deteriorated facilities.
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knowledge). The footprint i = D, C indicates whether a decentralized (D) or 
centralized (C ) structure has been chosen for the facility management.
The competence is restricted to the interval 0 < αi + βi ≤ 1, where 1 indicates 
perfect competence, i.e. that the maintenance expenditures are used as efficiently 
as possible. αi and βi capture commonly used arguments in favor of centralized and 
decentralized solutions, respectively. A centralized facility management agency 
should, due to its explicit focus on facilities, have a higher technical competence 
than the service producing agency. The service producer is, on the other hand, 
expected to have higher local knowledge. I.e. αC > αD and βD > βC. Thus we have 
an ambiguity where αC + βC 
≥
<   αD + βD. The sponsor’s utility is maximized when 
the production is maximized. The first order condition (FoC) is
 
( ) ,  ,  i i
x x i D C
r K
α β∂ ∂= + =
∂ ∂  
(5)
Since the sponsor decides the allocation in the centralized case and has perfect 
information about the competence of the facility management agency, he will 
impose the first best solution in the centralized case.3 The sponsor will choose 
to increase the grant to the service producer (r) at the expense of the grant to the 
facility manager (m) if he knows that some of m will be wasted due to imperfect 
competence.
The decentralized case is slightly less straightforward. Since the sponsor 
grants Y to the service producer and the service producer gets to decide the 
allocation between m and r, the sponsor has limited possibilities to impose the 
first best solution. I thus also have to take the incentives of the service producer 
into account. As the sponsor, the service producing agency has a positive utility of 
production. Importantly, it also has an additional utility from shifting its spending 
towards operational costs.4 The spending bias may involve rent extraction, but can 
also be due to that the service producer perceives operational expenditures to be 
more closely linked to its core task of producing services.
 
 wD = u (X ) + γ (r)  (6) 
It is reasonable to assume that the sponsor is able to monitor the service producer 
3  Production of public services is a complex operation in itself, and adding facility management 
as an additional task will clearly add to this complexity. For the sponsor, monitoring of an agency’s 
activities becomes increasingly difficult the more complex the operations of the agency become. 
Hence, it will be harder to monitor a complex service producing agency than an agency with facility 
management as its sole purpose. As a consequence, I simplify by disregarding the monitoring 
problem in the centralized case altogether. In a previous version of the model, I introduced limited 
monitoring of the centralized facility manager as well. However, as long as I assume the monitoring 
problem to be lower in the centralized case, the results are qualitatively the same. Likewise, it is a 
convenient simplification to assume that the sponsor has perfect information about the abilities of 
the agencies. Relaxing this (perhaps implausible) assumption would complicate the model, since we 
could then have a signaling game between the agency and the sponsor.
4 For a discussion about the incentives of public agencies, see for example Niskanen (1971).
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and enforce its preferred allocation to some extent. I illustrate the monitoring 
problem by 0 ≤ θ < 1. If θ = 0, the monitoring is perfect and the service producer 
is totally unable to deviate from the sponsor’s preferred allocation. Thus, I can 
formulate the utility of the service producer, given the level of monitoring
 
 ( ) ( )Dw u X rθγ= +  (7)
Since the service producer decides the allocation in the decentralized 
structure, conditioned on the level of monitoring, we obtain the FoC in the 
decentralized case by differentiating through (7)
 
/
( )
/
D D
x x r
r K u x
γα β θ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= + −
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
 (8)
In a world of perfect monitoring (θ = 0) this collapses to the first best solution. 
The sponsor should then choose to centralize if αC + βC ≥ αD + βD, since this 
gives the best utilization of m. If the sponsor cannot monitor the service producer 
agency perfectly (θ > 0), a second argument in favor of centralization arises. This 
is due to the second term which specifies a dead weight loss (from the view of 
the sponsor). The dead weight loss increases when the possibility to monitor is 
low and when the service producer puts much weight on operational spending 
relative to service production. The monitoring problem thus has the efect that the 
sponsor may gain from centralizing even in cases where the total competence of 
the service producing agency is higher than in the centralized facility management 
agency, i.e. αD + βD ≥ αC + βC.
The very stylized model offers a few testable predictions. First, local 
governments with possibilities to establish a highly qualified central facility 
management agency will benefit more from centralization. I expect this to be the 
case in urban areas, because of better access to highly qualified personnel. Second, 
I expect that local governments that find it difficult to monitor the activities of their 
service producer(s) are more likely to centralize. I will consider two observable 
characteristics I assume to be related to the possibility of monitoring. I expect 
that the sponsor’s ability to monitor the service producer is lower (i.e. θ is larger) 
in (i) large municipalities, since these have more and larger service producers 
than smaller local governments and (ii) in local governments with weak political 
leadership. A more precise specification of the hypotheses to be tested is presented 
in Section 4 where the empirical specification is discussed.
3 Survey data on the choice of organizational structure
As in other Scandinavian countries, Norwegian local governments provide 
important welfare services like child care, primary and lower secondary education, 
primary health care, and care for the elderly. After labor, facilities are probably the 
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most important input in production of local public services.5 In this paper I aim to 
study the facility management for the two most important building types, schools 
and health care buildings. The two make up close to 50% and well above 20% of 
the local government building mass respectively.
The first data source is from a government commission (NOU, 2004) 
that was set up to evaluate the facility management in the local public sector. 
The commission conducted a survey on building conditions, maintenance, and 
organization of the facility management. The survey was mailed to all local 
governments and achieved a response rate of 55%. Small local governments 
(population size below 5,000) are underrepresented in the sample. Unfortunately, 
this data set contains too little variation to be used in the formal analyses presented 
in this paper, but it can still be interesting to look at some descriptive statistics.6
As part of the survey, the respondents7 were asked to classify their 
organizational framework for the operation and maintenance of their facilities. 
Table 1 presents the distribution of the responses to the 2004 survey. Note that 
the centralized and decentralized structures both have several sub-categories. For 
my purposes, however, it is only interesting to separate between a centralized or 
decentralized framework. The categories C, D and E represent the centralized 
categories. The others indicate different versions of the decentralized structure.
5 For a discussion about the incentives of public agencies, see for example Niskanen (1971).
6 For an example, see Hopland (2012, 2013b) and references therein where the link between 
school facilities condition and student achievement is studied. Even though the link is weak, the sign 
of the coefficients indicate that good conditions may help to improve achievement.
7 For both surveys the respondents are in leading positions in the local government administration. 
In almost all cases the respondent serves as either the chief administrative ofcer (Rådmannen) or the 
chief facility manager
Table 1. Distribution of answers. 2004 survey.
Category School buildings 
(N=241)
Health care 
buildings (N=240)
A. The individual user/institution is 
responsible for the management of their 
properties
21 8.71% 19 7.92%
B. The central agency (school, health 
care, etc.) manages the properties for their 
institutions
18 7.47% 18 7.50%
C. Municipal agency 181 75.10% 181 75.42%
D. Municipal enterprise 12 4.98% 13 5.42%
E. Share holding companies, partly (or fully) 
owned by the municipality
1 0.41% 1 0.42%
F. Inter-municipal collaboration 1 0.41% 1 0.42%
G. Other 7 2.90% 7 2.92%
Decentralized (A, B, G) 46 19% 44 18%
Centralized (C, D, E, F) 195 81% 196 82%
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We observe that more than 80% used one of the centralized structures, with 
the municipal agency as the far most common.
The second source of information is a survey from 2010/2011.8 This was 
meant as a follow up to the government commission survey and the design is 
therefore very similar. The survey was initially e-mailed to all local governments 
and we received 145 answers, or roughly 34% of the local governments. Because 
of the limited number of responses on the full (and very comprehensive) survey, the 
non-respondents were contacted and encouraged to answer the specific question 
regarding their choice of organizational structure. This resulted in 235 additional 
responses so that I for 2010 have data for a total of 380 local governments (88% 
of the local governments). With such a large share of the local governments I am 
confident that I have a representative sample. The answers from this survey are 
summarized in Table 2.
Table 2 displays a picture which is fairly similar to that observed in Table 
1. However, it is worthwhile noting that the centralized structures are even more 
frequently observed than in the data from the 2004 survey. This may indicate that 
we are still in a transitional phase where more local governments shift towards 
the centralized framework. The trend towards centralization is also observed 
when we look at the 214 local governments that participated in both surveys. We 
observe that around 25 local governments changed from one of the decentralized 
structures to a centralized structure during this period. However, the picture is not 
perfectly clear-cut. A few also report to have changed from a centralized structure 
to more decentralized structures. This suggests that the process of sorting local 
8 I refer to this as the 2010 data. The survey was conducted as a project at the Center for Real 
Estate and Facilities Management at NTNU, and was designed by the research group (including the 
author).
Table 2. Distribution of answers. 2010 survey.
Category School buildings 
(N=380)
Health care buildings 
(N=380)
A. The individual user/institution is 
responsible for the management of their 
properties
18 4.74% 20 5.26%
B. The central agency (school, health 
care, etc.) manages the properties for 
their institutions
7 1.84% 8 2.11%
C. Municipal agency 308 81.05% 307 80.79%
D. Municipal enterprise 22 5.79% 21 5.53%
E. Share holding companies, partly (or 
fully) owned by the municipality
0 0% 0 0%
F. Inter-municipal collaboration 2 0.53% 2 0.53%
G. Other 23 6.05% 22 5.79%
Decentralized (A, B, G) 48 13% 50 13%
Centralized (C, D, E, F) 332 87% 330 87%
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governments into the structure that they find to be most favorable goes both 
ways. Interestingly, those that changed to a decentralized structure are rural local 
governments, indicating that my hypotheses are not too far fetched. The time 
variation between the surveys is, unfortunately, too small for me to exploit the 
panel dimension9 in the formal empirical analysis, so I use only the data from the 
2010 survey. The following section outlines my empirical approach.
4	 Empirical	Specification
The aim of the empirical discussion is to investigate whether local governments 
with a centralized facility management differ systematically from those with a 
decentralized structure and if the observed differences are consistent with the 
hypotheses from the theoretical framework. The empirical discussion is based on 
the logit equation
 
1prob(C 1| Dem ,  Pol ,  Fiscal )
1 exp( λ Dem λ Pol λ Fiscal )
B
i i i i B B B
D i P i F i
= =
+ − − −  (9)
CBi is a dummy which equals one if local government i has chosen a centralized 
management structure for building type B (schools or health care buildings). The 
choice variables are summarized in Table 3. Demi , Poli and Fiscali are vectors 
consisting of demographic, political and fiscal variables respectively.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the binary choices.
Variable Mean 
(st.dev)
Sample
Centralized management for 
school buildings
0.87 
(0.33)
(N=380)
Centralized management for 
health care buildings
0.87 
(0.34)
(N=380)
The demographic variables are the share of the population living in densely 
populated areas and the population. Since roughly 80% of the local governments 
with a decentralized structure have less than 5,000 inhabitants, I use three dummies 
that equal 1 if the population in a local government is either below 2,000, between 
2,000 and 3,000 or between 3,000 and 5,000, rather than the number of inhabitants. 
Rural local governments may have problems attracting highly qualified personnel 
to the facility management agency. As a consequence the potential efficiency 
boost due to higher technical competence in a centralized facility manager is 
reduced. Further, large and urban municipalities will have a larger number of 
service producers, complicating the sponsor’s monitoring. Hence, I expect the 
share of the population living in densely populated areas to come out as positive 
when estimating the probability of choosing a centralized structure. Likewise I 
expect the small local government dummies to come out as negative.
9 More time variation would allow me to study variation within cross-sectional units, a method 
widely used in econometrics to reduce omitted variables bias.
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I also expect political fragmentation to be associated with monitoring 
problems. The political system at the local government level is a representative 
democracy where the members of the local council are elected every fourth year. 
The national parties are important players, and the national struggle between 
the socialist and non-socialist camps is mirrored at the local level. Compared to 
national politics, a main difference is that the majority coalition does not form a 
cabinet. The typical organization is an alderman model with an executive board 
with proportional representation from all major parties. The executive board is led 
by the mayor, and the members of the executive board, including the mayor and 
the deputy mayor, are elected among the members of the local council.
Several studies of Norwegian local governments have emphasized the 
impact of political strength. Political strength is shown to reduce administrative 
spending (Kalseth and Rattsø, 1998), to increase efficiency (Borge et al., 2008 
among others), to reduce the budget deficit (Borge, 2005) and to give better 
maintenance (Borge and Hopland, 2012). I expect that strong politicians will also 
be better suited to perform monitoring than their weaker counterparts. Hence, I 
expect that political fragmentation is positively associated with the probability to 
adopt a centralized structure. I use the efective number of parties (EN OP ), which 
is the inverse of the traditional Herfindahl-Hirschman index
 
1
2
1
P
p
p
ENOP SH
−
=
 
=  
 
∑  (10)
where SHp is the share of representatives from party p. In my sample, the effective 
number of parties varies from 1.7 to nearly 7, with an average just above 4. Since 
a higher value indicates more fragmentation, I expect it to come out as positive in 
the regressions. In Norway, the socialist camp is dominated by the Labor party, 
while the non-socialist camp is more fragmented. As a consequence, there is a 
negative correlation between party fragmentation and the share of socialists in the 
local council.10 Since I cannot rule out that socialist influence has an impact on 
the choice of organizational framework, I will control for the share of socialists. 
Socialist parties are defined as the social democrats (The Labor Party) and all 
parties to its left.
In addition, I include a set of fiscal indicators. It is not given how fiscal 
conditions affect the choice of structure. One may have that local governments 
with low revenues are eager to reform because they hope to be able to reduce 
costs. On the other hand, one may have that local governments experiencing fiscal 
stress cannot afford to start the reform process, due to transaction costs. The main 
fiscal variable is local government revenue. I use an indicator of real per capita 
revenue published by the Ministry of Local Government, which is widely accepted 
as the most reliable indicator of fiscal capacity. While the local governments enjoy 
a fairly wide discretion as to deciding their expenditures, their revenues are to a 
10 The correlation between the effective number of parties and the share of socialists is –0.42.
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large extent based on centrally set tax rates and grants. The starting point is the 
sum of block grants and local tax revenues. Most taxes are of the revenue sharing 
type, and the tax revenues comprise income and wealth tax from individuals, as 
well as the property tax. Since the block grant system provides compensation 
for high spending needs, the revenues must be “deflated” in order to capture the 
real differences across local governments. An index of spending needs from the 
spending needs equalization system is used as deflator. It captures unfavorable 
cost conditions related to population size, settlement pattern, the age composition 
of the population, and social factors.
In addition to per capita revenues as indicator of fiscal capacity, I have tried to 
include a number of indicators of fiscal distress. Fiscal distress is broadly defined as 
actual fiscal performance in relation to the balanced-budget-rule (BBR). The main 
requirement in the Norwegian BBR is operational budget balance. In the budget 
(or ex ante), current revenues must be sufficient to cover current expenditures 
(wages and materials) and debt servicing costs (net interest payment and net 
installment on debt). It turned out that only one measure of fiscal distress came 
out as significant, and I thus restrict the discussion to this. The variable captures 
whether the local government is included in the Register for State Review and 
Approval of Financial Obligations (ROBEK). The register lists local governments 
that have violated the BBR by passing a budget with a net operating deficit or have 
been unable to cover an actual deficit within two years.11 The far most common 
reason for being in the register is that it has taken too long to cover a deficit. The 
consequence of being in the register is that the budget and resolutions to raise 
new loans must be approved by the county governor, the central government’s 
representative in the county. Local governments in the register are subject to 
stronger central government control, and must tighten their budgetary policy in 
order to be removed from the register.
The local government revenue is measured as the average over the period 
1998–2010, while the averages of the political variables capture average of 
the electoral periods 1995–99, 1999–2003, 2003–07 and 2007–11. The Robek 
variable is measured as the number of months the local government was listed in 
this register during 2001–2009.12
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics and a comparison of the local 
governments with a centralized and decentralized structure on their facility 
management. A few local governments have a decentralized structure on either 
schools or health care buildings and a centralized structure on the other. To 
keep the table easy to read, I only separate the local governments that have a 
centralized structure on either one of them from those which have a decentralized 
structure on both. This does not matter for the averages reported, since it regards 
very few local governments (see Table 1). From this raw comparison we observe 
that there are some interesting differences between the local governments with 
11 An actual deficit is covered when future surpluses are at least as large as the deficit.
12 The register was established in 2001. For a more thorough discussion about the register, see 
Hopland (2013a).
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a centralized structure and those that use a decentralized structure. It seems that 
the local governments that have a centralized structure on average have a higher 
share of their population living in urban areas, larger population, a higher degree 
of party fragmentation and lower revenues. Even though the observations from 
the descriptive statistics are in accordance with my hypotheses, I cannot make any 
conclusions before I have studied the results from the formal estimations. These 
are presented in the following section.
This paper studies the relationship between the choice of organizational 
structure and a very few key characteristics of the local governments. There can be a 
variety of different characteristics that are also of great importance for this choice. 
Such characteristics could for example include the technical competence among 
key persons in the political leadership or the top administration. The competence 
of key individuals such as janitors may also potentially be of great importance 
for the choices made, particularly in small and transparent local governments. 
Unfortunately, the available data limits the number of testable hypotheses.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics, explanatory variables.
Full sample avg.
(st.dev.)
Avg. cent.
(st.dev.)
Avg. decent.
(st.dev.)
Difference in
averages
Share (%) of pop. living 51 53 37 16 ***
in densely pop. areas (28) (27) (26)
No. of observations 380 334 46 380
Pop. under 2,000 0.22 0.19 0.39 –0.20 ***
(0.41) (0.39) (0.49)
No. of observations 380 334 46 380
Pop. 2,000–3,000 0.14 0.13 0.24 –0.11 *
(0.35) (0.34) (0.43)
No. of observations 380 334 46 380
Pop. 3,000–5,000 0.17 0.16 0.26 –0.10 *
(0.38) (0.37) (0.44)
No. of observations 380 334 46 380
Efective number 4.14 4.19 3.77 0.42 ***
of parties (0.95) (0.94) (0.95)
No. of observations 375 328 47
Share of socialists 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.01
in the local council (0.13) (0.13) (0.15)
No. of observations 377 330 47
Local government 106.69 105.61 114.32 –8.71 **
revenue (23.33) (23.58) (20.17)
No. of observations 377 330 47
Central government 23.88 22.65 32.55 –9.90 *
control (Robek) (35.28) (33.60) (44.83)
No. of observations 377 330 47
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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I have, however, tried to include a variety of control variables in order to 
check the robustness of the estimates. These include variables capturing the age 
composition in the local governments. These may be interpreted as the relative 
strength of interest groups representing different service sectors. It is possible that 
a strong focus on certain services may also affect the choice of framework for 
the facility management. Similarly, I have also tried to control for the influence 
of different political parties (in addition to the control for the share of socialists). 
However, neither age composition nor political preferences seem to matter and I 
thus omit them from the analysis. As discussed in the Introduction, it is not very 
surprising that political preferences seem to play little role for this question.
5 Results
Because of the limited variation in the data I focus on the direction of the links 
rather than marginal effects when studying the empirical findings. This has two 
implications for the following discussion. First, I am careful not to interpret the 
findings as strictly identified causal relationships, since there may be characteristics 
that I am unable to control for. Second, as an extension of this I do not focus on a 
detailed discussion of marginal effects.
Rather I restrict myself to a discussion about the signs and significance of 
the coefficients and whether these are consistent with the predictions from the 
theoretical framework.
In the tables, each column presents results for a separate regression, each 
presenting slightly different versions of Equation (9). The different variations are 
Table 5. Estimation of probability of choosing  
a centralized structure for school buildings. Logit.
Variables (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Share of pop. living 
in densely pop. areas
0.0198*** 
(0.00551)
0.00397 
(0.00756)
0.0136* 
(0.00735)
0.0126* 
(0.00734)
Pop. under 2,000 –1.927*** 
(0.470)
–1.761*** 
(0.606)
–1.628*** 
(0.552)
–1.580*** 
(0.582)
Pop. 2,000–3,000 –1.809*** 
(0.513)
–1.676*** 
(0.628)
–1.559*** 
(0.564)
–1.395** 
(0.559)
Pop. 3,000–5,000 –1.710*** 
(0.502)
–1.612*** 
(0.562)
–1.603*** 
(0.511)
–1.543*** 
(0.512)
Efective number of 
parties
0.434** 
(0.220)
0.259 
(0.207)
0.483** 
(0.214)
0.357* 
(0.208)
Share of socialists 1.311 
(1.410)
0.903 
(1.395)
1.664 
(1.443)
1.309 
(1.420)
Local government 
revenue
–0.00816 
(0.00498)
–0.00224 
(0.00525)
Central government 
control (ROBEK)
–0.0104** 
(0.00452)
–0.00971** 
(0.00474)
Observations 380 380 380 374 374 372 372
Robust standard errors in parentheses. A constant term (not reported) included.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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Table 6. Estimation of probability of choosing  
a centralized structure for health care buildings. Logit.
VARIABLES (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Share of pop. 
living in densely 
pop. areas
0.0182***
(0.00564)
0.00223
(0.00747)
0.0124*
(0.00753)
0.0114
(0.00759)
Pop. under 2,000 –1.858***
(0.447)
–1.764***
(0.565)
–1.606***
(0.523)
–1.615***
(0.558)
Pop. 2,000–3,000 –1.670***
(0.495)
–1.595***
(0.594)
–1.458***
(0.541)
–1.294**
(0.542)
Pop. 3,000–5,000 –1.571***
(0.483)
–1.515***
(0.533)
–1.485***
(0.490)
–1.434***
(0.493)
Efective number 
of parties
0.431*
(0.221)
0.229
(0.208)
0.495**
(0.219)
0.340
(0.212)
Share of socialists 1.078
(1.420)
0.559
(1.377)
1.492
(1.464)
1.000
(1.423)
Local government 
revenue
–0.00794
(0.00492)
–0.00105
(0.00542)
Central 
government 
control (ROBEK)
–0.0116***
(0.00422)
–0.0111**
(0.00447)
Observations 380 380 380 374 374 372 372
Robust standard errors in parentheses. A constant term (not reported) included.
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
intended to shed light on which variables that seem to be most important, and to 
check how sensitive the results are to small changes in the model.
Table 5 reports results from estimations using school buildings, while Table 
6 reports the results when studying health care buildings. Since the results are very 
similar, I discuss the tables jointly. Consistent with my hypothesis, we observe 
that the share of the population living in densely populated areas comes out as 
positive while the population dummies are negative. The population seems to be 
the most important determinant, since the population dummies are always highly 
significant, and very stable across the different specifications. The share of the 
population living in densely populated areas is significant as long as the population 
dummies are omitted, but loses its significance when these are included.
As expected, I also obtain positive coefficients for the party fragmentation. 
These are also fairly stable and mostly significant. The share of socialists comes 
out as positive but insignificant. Interestingly, income does not seem to matter for 
the choice of organizational structure. However, the Robek variable comes out as 
significantly negative.
This indicates that local governments that have been subject to fiscal 
distress over some time have not centralized their facility management. A 
possible explanation is that local governments in dire straits are worried about 
the transactional costs that follow from a change in organizational structure. 
However, if the decentralized structure is more costly than the centralized, the 
causality may actually be reversed. This correlation must thus be interpreted with 
particular caution.
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This paper has aimed to study the choice between a decentralized and centralized 
structure on the facility management in Norwegian local governments. Until the 
mid-1990s almost all local governments had a decentralized structure, but in 2010 
the picture is opposite with more than 85% having a centralized structure. This 
trend is in accordance with the recommendations from a government commission 
(NOU, 2004) studying the topic and recommending centralization. Despite the 
recommendations in NOU (2004), however, a considerable number of local 
governments have kept a decentralized structure. In this paper I have asked 
whether this is necessarily because these local governments are lagging behind 
in the development, or if different structures may present the best fit for different 
local governments.
I discuss a stylized framework which suggests that a centralized structure 
not necessarily will be superior for all local governments. Rather, the prediction 
is that small and rural local governments may be better off with a decentralized 
structure. This is because such local governments are likely to have less gain in 
terms of high competence in a central facility agency. Further, local governments 
that are able to monitor their service producers effectively, can to a larger extent 
ensure that the service producer takes well care of its facilities, reducing the need 
for a separate facility manager. It is likely that monitoring is easier in small local 
governments. Finally, it is reasonable to assume that a strong political leadership 
will be more capable of monitoring their service producers than more fragmented 
ones. Hence, the empirical discussion was based on population, urbanity and 
political fragmentation.
The empirical findings are consistent with the predictions from the theoretical 
model. It seems that large local governments with a weak political leadership 
centralize their facility management, while small local governments with a strong 
political leadership prefer a de-centralized structure. The local governments thus 
seem to be able to consider the different structure and choose the one that fits them 
best. This is in contrast to a widespread opinion that all should centralize and that 
the ones with a decentralized structure are lagging behind in the development.
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